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KEYS TO UNLOCK THE INTERLOCKS: 
DEALING WITH INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES 
The use of interlocking directorates 1 by American industrial and com-
merical corporations is widespread.2 Section 83 of the Clayton Act has 
been interpreted as prohibiting only interlocks between directly compet-
ing firms. 4 There are other kinds of interlocks with substantial anticom-
petitive effects, however, that have essentially escaped any regulation 
under the antitrust laws. 5 This article will examine whether the deleteri-
ous effects of unregulated interlocks should be a source of concern. It will 
conclude that these interlocks should not remain unregulated because 
they are presumptively anticompetitive, produce problems that section 8 
1 An interlocking directorate exists where one person sits on the boards of directors of at 
least two corporations. 
2 See notes 40-47 and accompanying text infra. 
3 15 u .s.c. § 19 (1970). 
4 Such an interpretation leaves a variety of interlocks outside of the ban. For example, 
indirect interlocks, interlocks between indirect competitors, and vertical interlocks have all 
been permitted. See notes 28-39 and accompanying text infra. The fourth paragraph of 
section 8 provides in relevant part: 
No person at the same time shall be a director in any two or more corporations, any 
one of which has capital, surplus, and undivided profits aggregating more than 
$1,000,000, engaged in whole or part in commerce, other than banks, banking 
associations, trust companies, and common carriers subject to the Act to regulate 
commerce ... if such corporations are or shall have been theretofore, by virtue of 
their business and location of operation, competitors, so that the elimination of 
competition by agreement between them would constitute a violation of any of the 
provisions of any of the antitrust laws. 
The first three paragraphs of the section deal with horizontal interlocks between member 
Federal Reserve banks and other banks, banking associations, savings banks, or trust 
companies. 
Section 8 is enforced by both the Justice Department through civil actions in the courts 
(injunctive decree) and the FTC through its own administrative proceedings (cease and 
desist order). In both instances, defendants are usually given an opportunity to settle either 
through a consent decree (Justice Department) or a consent order (FTC). In addition, 
private parties may bring suit under section 8 for treble damages and injunctive relief. 
From 1914 to 1965, the Department of Justice initiated a total of ten cases to enforce 
section 8. The Department did not undertake a systematic program of enforcement with 
respect to interlocks until after World War II, and the first cases to reach the courts were not 
filed until 1952, thirty-eight years after the enactment of the section. During the same period, 
the FTC filed thirteen complaints under section 8. Only one resulted in a cease and desist 
order; the rest were dismissed when the directors resigned from one of the interlocked 
corporations. STAFF OF THE ANTITRUST SUBCOMM. OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE 
JUDICIARY, 89th CONG., !st SESS., REPORT ON INTERLOCKS IN CORPORATE MANAGEMENT 
57, 227 (Comm. Print 1965) [hereinafter cited as STAFF REPORT]. 
There is a similar paucity of private section 8 cases. Prior to 1974, there were only nine 
such suits. See Note, Private Enforcement of Section 8' s Prohibition of Interlocking Direc-
torates, 54 B.U.L. Rev. 659, 660 n.11 (1974). 
• This article will refer to the interlocks not reached by a traditional reading of section 8 as 
unregulated interlocks. These interlocks have been challenged only recently. See notes 
93-189 and accompanying text infra. 
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was designed to address, and conflict with the basic goals of the antitrust 
laws. The article will then discuss presently available methods ofreaching 
these interlocks, particularly the Justice Department's attempts to read 
section 8 more broadly than it has traditionally been read and the Federal 
Trade Commission's efforts to challenge interlocks through section 5 of 
the Federal Trade Commission Act. 6 In addition, the article will examine 
proposed legislation that takes a stricter approach toward interlocks. 
I. TRADITIONAL SCOPE OF SECTION 8 
Section 8 was passed in 1914 amidst a climate of reform. By the early 
1900's the use of interlocking directorates along with other business 
practices had become a subject of increased public concern. Louis D. 
Brandeis in a series of articles in Harper's Weekly7 attacked interlocks 
from both political and economic perspectives. 8 At the same time, Con-
gressional investigations disclosed instances of anticompetitive practices 
that were implemented through interlocking directorates. 9 This concern 
was manifested in an address by President Wilson to Congress calling for 
legislation that would cover horizontal, vertical, indirect, and manage-
• 15 U .S.C. § 45 (Supp. V. 1975). 
7 Brandeis, Breaking the Money Trusts, HARPER'S WEEKLY, Nov. 22, 1913 to Jan. 17, 
1914. 
8 The following quotation illustrates Mr. Brandeis' convictions: 
The practice of interlocking directorates is the root of many evils. It offends laws 
human and divine. Applied to rival corporations, it tends to the suppression of 
competition and to violation of the Sherman law. Applied to corporations which 
deal with each other, it tends to disloyalty and to violation of the fundamental law 
that no man can serve two masters. In either event it tends to inefficiency; for it 
removes incentive and destroys soundness of judgment. It is undemocratic, for it 
rejects the platform: "A fair field and no favors,"-substituting the pull of privilege 
for the push of manhood. 
Brandeis, The Endless Chain: Interlocking Directorates, HARPER'S WEEKLY, Dec. 6, 1913, 
at 13. 
9 See HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, INVESTIGATION OF UNITED STATES 
STEEL CoRP., H.R. REP. No. 1127, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. (1912). As a result of its investiga-
tion, the Committee concluded that interlocking directorates had resulted in inside dealing 
for personal gain, reduced prices for favored customers, preferential treatment for favored 
suppliers, and excessive fees paid to favored representatives for services supplied. It 
reported that these effects were attributable to the community of interests among the 
directors of the interlocked corporations. Id., at 209-10. See also HousE COMM. ON BANK-
ING AND CURRENCY, INVESTIGATION OF CONCENTRATION OF CONTROL OF MONEY AND 
CREDIT, H.R. REP. No. 1593, 62d Cong., 3d Sess. (1913). The committee discovered that 
the country's leading financiers held multiple directorships in banks, insurance companies, 
railroads, industrial corporations, and public utilities. It recognized the deleterious 
economic and political effects of these interlocks and recommended that steps be taken to 
limit them. Id. at 55-106, 138-42. 
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ment interlocking relationships. 10 Nevertheless, the congressional re-
sponse, embodied in section 8, covered only interlocking directorates 
between direct competitors. 
Section S's fourth paragraph, 11 known as the industrial corporations' 
provision, contains four requirements that interlocked corporations must 
meet to come under the section. First, one of the interlocked corporations 
must have "capital, surplus, and undivided profits aggregating more than 
$1,000,000. " 12 Second, the interlocked corporations must be engaged in 
commerce. 13 Third, the challenged interlocks must be between two or 
more corporations "other than banks, banking associations, trust com-
panies, and common carriers. " 14 Fourth, the interlocked corporations 
must be or have been competitors, so that the elimination of competition 
by agreement would violate one of the antitrust laws. 15 
Controversy over the scope of section 8 in the past centered on the 
fourth requirement of competition. United States v. Sears, Roebuck and 
Co. 16 provided the firstjudicial construction, which has been accepted in 
subsequent cases. The Sears court adopted aper se test of illegality: if an 
agreement between the interlocked firms to cease competition would 
violate any of the antitrust laws, then the interlock is illegal per se .17 In 
Sears, B. F. Goodrich Company and Sears shared a common director and 
also competed with each other in the sale of various items at the retail 
level. 18 An agreement between them to eliminate competition, such as 
price-fixing, would surely violate the law. Therefore, the interlock vio-
lated section 8.19 
Direct interlocks between directly competing corporations, which are 
subject to the per se ban of section 8,20 present significant potential 
anticompetitive effects. 21 The interlocks tend to unite the boards of direc-
10 President Wilson wanted a law that would: 
[E)ffectively prohibit and prevent such interlockings of the personnel of the direc-
torates of great corporations ... as in effect result in making those who borrow and 
those who lend practically one and the same, those who sell and those who buy but 
the same persons trading with one another under different names and in different 
combinations, and those who affect to compete in fact partners and masters of 
some whole field of business. 
H.R. REP. No. 627, 63.d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1914). 
11 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1970). See note 4 supra. 
12 Id. 
13 Jd. 
14 Id. This requirement is known as the "other than" clause. See notes I07-17 and 
accompanying text infra. 
IS J5 U.S.C. § 19 (1970). 
16 Ill F. Supp. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). 
17 Id. at 620-21. 
18 Id. at 615. 
19 Id. at 621. 
20 Protectoseal Co., v. Barancik, 484 F.2d 585, 588-89 (7th Cir. 1972) (the court followed 
the Sears approach); See STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at 25-26; FEDERAL TRADE COMMIS-
SION, REPORT OF THE FTC ON INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES, H.R. Doc. No. 652, 81st 
Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1951) [hereinafter cited as FTC REPORT]. 
21 See STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at 7; FTC REPORT, supra note 20, at 14; Travers, 
Interlocks in Corporate Management and the Antitrust Laws, 46 TEX. L. REv. 819, 840-41 
(1969). 
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tors of the competing companies, thus reducing the independence of the 
management of the firms. The possibility of exchanges of competitive 
information is increased, creating incentives for anticompetitive conduct 
and reconciliation of conflicting interests. Furthermore, the interlocks 
provide a ready means for accomplishing such conduct by joining compet-
ing management in the board room. 
The per se ban on direct interlocks is a sound policy. Other types of 
interlocks, however, can have equally significant anticompetitive ef-
fects.22 Nevertheless, these other interlocks are not covered under the 
present narrow reading of section 8 which limits the applicability of the 
section to direct interlocks between directly competing corporations. 
In enacting section 8, Congress was concerned with the antkompetitive 
effects of all interlocks, not just those of direct interlocks between direct 
competitors. 23 It was troubled with the concentration of economic power 
in the board rooms of these interlocked corporations24 and sought to 
preserve competition and economic opportunity as well as to prevent the 
directors of large corporations from being placed in positions of conflict-
ing responsibilities. 25 The specific prohibition of direct interlocks did not 
mean that Congress was unconcerned with other kinds of interlocks; 
rather, it was this kind of interlock which presented the most immediate 
and obvious dangers. Furthermore, when the Clayton Act was written, 
Congress had no prior experience with legislation dealing with interlock-
ing directorates. Consequently, Congress might have been reluctant to 
push too far too fast. 26 A narrow interpretation of section 8, therefore, is 
22 See notes 64-85 and accompanying text infra. 
23 This is also how Sen. Floyd Haskell, chairman of the Senate Interior Special Subcom-
mittee on Integrated Oil Operations, views the purpose of section 8. After releasing a report 
on the petroleum industry, see SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON INTEGRATED OIL COMPANIES, 
SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 94th CONG, 2d SESS., THE STRUC-
TURE OF THE U.S. PETROLEUM INDUSTRY (Comm. Print 1976), he criticized the extensive 
number of interlocking directorates involving oil companies apparently permitted under 
section 8 and said, "[11here is no doubt in my mind that these [the interlocks] are contrary to 
the intent of section 8 .... " [1976] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. A-14 (July 20, 
1976). 
24 Such congressional concern is illustrated in the House Report that accompanied H.R. 
15657 (the proposed Clayton Act). Section 8 was described as follows: 
The importance of the legislation ... cannot be overestimated. The concentration 
of wealth, money, and property in the United States under the control and in the 
hands of a few individuals or great corporations has grown to such an enormous 
extent that unless checked it will ultimately threaten the perpetuity of our institu-
tions. The idea that there are only a few men in any of our great corporations and 
industries who are capable of handling the affairs of the same is contrary to the 
spirit of our institutions ... [11he only real service the same director in a great 
number of corporations renders is in maintaining uniform policies throughout the 
entire system for which he acts .... " 
H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 19-20 (1914). 
25 See 51 CONG. REc. 11539 (1914). "What we are trying to do is to preserve each one 
[corporation] as an independent unit in business, so that they will act in their affairs without 
any regard to the interests of the others .... " Id. (remarks of Sen. Cummins); FTC REPORT, 
supra note 20, at 5, 17. 
26 See FTC REPORT, supra note 20, at 13. 
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both contrary to congressional intent and unwarranted in light of the 
dangers of unregulated interlocks that have become apparent over time. 27 
II. UNREGULATED INTERLOCKS 
A. Extent of Unregulated Interlocks 
A variety of different kinds of interlocks have been untouched by 
section 8. These traditionally unregulated interlocks fall into seven cate-
gories. 28 
J. Management Interlocks Between Directly Competing Corporations 
- Section 8 clearly prohibits competing corporations from sharing one or 
more common directors. The section has not reached the management 
interlock, however, where an officer of firm A sits on the board of 
competing firm B. For example, a vice-president of a machinery manufac-
turer is not prohibited from sitting on the board of a competitor.29 
2. Indirect Interlocks Between Directly Competing Corporations - An 
indirect interlock exists if the competing firms A and B each have one of 
their directors serving on the board of firm C which does not compete 
with A or B.30 An example of this interlock is the board of a large mer-
chandizing chain which includes a director from each of two electrical 
machinery manufacturers.31 
3. Direct Interlocks Between Indirectly Competing Corporations -
Here, the corporations are directly interlocked but compete indirectly 
through their subsidiaries. This occurs where firms D and E share a 
common director and D competes with firm F, a subsidiary of E. The 
same kind of interlock exists if D and E each have subsidiaries and the 
subsidiaries, not the parents, compete.32 
4. Direct Interlocks Between Potential Competitors - These interlocks 
occur if a director or directors are shared by firms that are not currently 
competitors but could easily become so. For example, firm G specializes 
in flat and plate glass production while firm H manufactures glass con-
tainers. Both firms are in the glass manufacturing industry but neither one 
competes with the other. Because of the relative ease in switching be-
tween product lines, the firms are, however, potential competitors.33 Yet, 
an interlock between the two is allowed. 
27 See notes 64-85 and accompanying text infra. 
28 This grouping is not meant to be exhaustive. There are many other forms of interlocking 
directorates not covered by section 8, but these can be analyzed as variants of the basic 
seven categories listed. For example, there are indirect interlocks between potential cus-
tomers, management interlocks between indirectly competing corporations, vertical man-
agement interlocks, etc. The farther removed the interlock is from one of the basic inter-
locks listed in the text, the less dangerous are its potential anticompetitive effects. 
29 See FTC REPORT, supra note 20, at 14; STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at 26. 
30 See FTC REPORT, supra note 20, at 15; Travers, supra note 21, at 848-49. 
31 See STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at 125, 140. 
32 See Kramer, Interlocking Directorates and the Clayton Act After 35 Years, 59 YALE 
L.J. 1266, 1268n. I I (1950). 
33 See FTC REPORT, supra note 20, at 25, 441-45; STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at 26. 
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5. Vertical Interlocks - A vertical interlock exists when directors are 
shared by corporations with a supplier-customer relationship. One exam-
ple of such an interlock is the sharing of a common director by firm I, a 
large steel producer, and firm J, an even larger automotive manufac-
turer. 34 Another vertical interlock exists when J interlocks with firm K, a 
rubber and tire producer.35 
6. Deputization Interlocks - Here, an outside corporation, not an 
individual, is the common director of two firms. If corporation X has one 
of its directors on the board of firm Land another on the board of M, a 
competitor of L, then X, through its deputies who sit on the boards of 
competing machine tool manufacturers, is itself the common director of 
the companies. 36 
7. Institutional Interlocks - These interlocks exist when major finan-
cial institutions share common directors with the leading corporations in a 
particular industry. 37 In the petroleum industry, for example, the leading 
oil companies have numerous interlocks with commercial banks and 
insurance companies.38 Another example is the electrical machinery in-
dustry, where the four largest firms are interlocked with financial institu-
tions. 39 
The prevalence of these different interlocks is evident from the compos-
ition of the boards of large corporations. Sitting on the board of American 
Telephone and Telegraph are directors from four oil companies (Exxon, 
Texaco, Mobil and Continental), three large merchandizing competitors 
(Marcor, J.C. Penny, and Federated Department Stores), four huge food 
producers (Kraft Co., General Foods, Campbell Soup, and Del Monte), 
the first and third largest automotive manufacturers (General Motors and 
Chrysler) (all of which are indirect interlocks between directly competing 
corporations); the number one steel producer (U.S. Steel) and at least six 
major steel customers (GM, Chrysler, Deere, Caterpillar, Boeing, and 
Kohler Co.) (vertical interlocks); and seven of the ten largest banks 
(Citicorp, Chase Manhattan, Manufacturers Hanover, Chemical, Bankers 
Trust, Continental Illinois, and Western Bancorporation) (which together 
with the oil companies constitute an institutional interlock). 40 Other cor-
34 See STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at 119-20. 
35 Id. at 122. 
36 This is in fact the challenged interlock in United States v. Cleveland Trust Co., 392 F. 
Supp. 699 (N.D. Ohio 1974), affd mem., 513 F.2d 633 (6th Cir. 1975). 
37 The institutional interlock can be viewed as the third tier of interlocking relationships 
between commercial corporations and financial institutions (notably commercial banks). In 
a sense it is the combination of the vertical and indirect interlocks. The first tier is a single 
bank interlocked with a single corporation, which can be analyzed as a vertical interlock. 
The second tier exists when the directors of several competing firms all sit on a single bank's 
board. At this stage, not only are there vertical interlocks but there is also an indirect 
interlock among the competing corporations. The final tier (institutional interlock) exists 
when the leading competitiors in an industry are interlocked with several of the major 
commercial banks. 
38 See note 42 and accompanying text infra. 
39 FTC REPORT, supra note 20, at 25. 
40 Turner, Interlocks-A Legislative View, 45 ANTITRUST L.J. 331, 336-37 (1976). 
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porate boards exhibit similar patterns. IBM's board, for example, illus-
trates both vertical interlocks (two large steel producers and seven steel 
customers) and institutional interlocks (five large energy companies and 
ten major banks plus five insurance companies). 41 
The major oil companies are extensively interlocked with the leading 
banks, thus creating vertical, indirect, and institutional interlocks. A 
recent report found four oil companies (Standard of California, Continen-
tal, Getty, and Union Oil) represented on the board of Bank of America 
(the nation's largest bank), four (Exxon, Mobil, Continental, and Atlantic 
Richfield) on the board of Chase Manhattan (second largest), three (Mo-
bil, Phillips, and Shell) on the board of First National City Bank (third 
largest), three (Exxon, Atlantic Richfield, and Cities Service) on the 
board of Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. (fifth largest) and three (Mobil, 
Exxon, and Texaco) on the board of Chemical Bank of New York (sixth 
largest). 42 
Two major studies have reported the extent of interlocking directo-
rates. The FTC's investigation43 of the 1,000 largest manufacturing cor-
porations focused on the interlocking relationships among these corpora-
tions, and between them and 330 non-manufacturing corporations. The 
FTC found that a substantial variety of interlocks existed, most of which 
were outside the scope of section 8. It concluded that the extent of the 
interlocks creates a strong probability that competition is reduced.44 The 
staff of the House Antitrust Subcommittee conducted the second study ,45 
which looked at interlocking management relations in a selected sample of 
corporations. 46 The study revealed the same extensive array of interlocks 
shown by the FTC study and the staff also reached the same conclusion: 
competition is likely to be impaired by the interlocks.47 
B. Effect of Unregulated Interlocks 
I. Suggested Beneficial Effects - A number of arguments have ad-
vanced supposed benefits that interlocks provide.48 One proposition is 
41 Id. 
42 Hearings on Corporate Disclosure Before the Subcomm. on Budgeting, Management, 
and Expenditures, and the Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations of the Senate Comm. 
on Government Operations, Part 2, S. Doc. No.62, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1010-11 (1974) 
(A. McDONALD, INTERLOCKING OIL: BIG OIL TIES WITH OTHER CORPORATIONS (1974)). A 
1976 study discovered similar extensive interlocks. See THE STRUCTURE OF THE U.S. 
PETROLEUM INDUSTRY, supra note 23, at 113-338. 
43 See FfC REPORT, supra note 20. 
44 Id. at 36. 
45 See STAFF REPORT, supra note 4. 
46 This sample consisted of 74 companies selected from three categories: industrial and 
commercial, banking, and insurance. Id. at 111. 
47 Id. at 230. 
46 For an illustration of arguments in defense of interlocks, see STAFF REPORT, supra note 
4, at 6-7; Travers, supra note 21, at 834; Wilson, Unlocking Interlocks: The On-Again Off-
Again Saga of Section 8 of the Clayton Act, 45 ANTITRUST L.J. 317, 329-30 (1976). 
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that the interlocks enable corporations to inject "dynamism" into their 
boards by obtaining outside directors with diverse backgrounds and ex-
perience gained in directing other firms. Second, the number of top 
executives who can fill director seats is limited. Interlocks allow these 
executives to serve several corporations, thus easing the talent shortage. 
Additional restrictions on interlocks would limit this already small talent 
pool and increase the difficulty of attracting highly qualified directors. 
This would force many corporations to settle for "second best" directors, 
thus causing an overall decline in the quality of corporate leadership. 
The practice of extensive interlocks, however, may actually decrease 
the quality of management, rather than increase it. A director serving on 
the boards of several corporations may be too busy to serve any of them 
effectively.49 Some have questioned whether the pool of top executives is 
so limited that restrictions on interlocks would pose any harm. 5° Further, 
the practice of extensive interlocks may actually restrict the size of the 
management pool. 51 Extensive interlocks foreclose opportunities for 
younger executives to gain experience as directors, experience which 
they need to become qualified directors, the very directors whose limited 
number "requires" the existence of interlocks. 
2. Potential Deleterious Effects - Opponents of interlocking director-
ates rely on three main arguments. First, they allege that extensive 
interlocks decrease the quality of management and actually restrict the 
size of the management pool.52 Second, interlocks may entangle the 
shared directors in conflict of interest problems because their loyalty is 
divided between two or more corporations.53 Third, an extensive array of 
interlocks has potentially serious anticompetitive implications.54 
To date, however, no empirical studies have ascertained that the unre-
gulated interlocks actually produce deleterious effects.55 While both the 
FTC56 and Antitrust Subcommittee57 reports documented the existence 
and extent of interlocks, neither attempted to study their economic ef-
49 Address by James T. Halverson, director of FTC Bureau of Competition, at the Loyola 
College Executive Seminar on the role of the Board of Directors, Baltimore, Md. (Apr. 8, 
1975), reprinted in [1975] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) E-1. 
50 Travers, supra note 21, at 836. 
51 STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at 8. 
52 See text accompanying notes 49-51 supra. 
53 For example, a director sitting on the boards of a supplier and customer (vertical 
interlock) cannot, in good conscience, recommend that either company take steps that might 
better its position at the expense of the other. If he does, he violates his duty of loyalty to 
one company, and if he abstains from voting on such a policy he deprives the other of his 
best judgment. Hence, whenever a director serves on the boards of two or more companies 
that have interests related to each other, he would tend to harmonize those interests as much 
as possible. See STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at 7-8; FTC REPORT, supra note 20, at 20-21. 
5 4 This article will concentrate on this third criticism since the antitrust laws are primarily, 
but not exclusively, concerned with effect on competition. 
55 Conversely, it should be noted that no studies have shown that the interlocks produce 
any beneficial effects. See note 58 irifra. 
56 FTC REPORT, supra note 20. 
57 STAFF REPORT, supra note 4. 
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fects. 58 Despite the absence of empirical evidence in this area, 59 both the 
FTC60 and the staff of the Antitrust Subcommittee61 nevertheless con-
cluded that the vast array of unregulated interlocks generated anticom-
petitive effects. The Subcommittee staff warned that it would be naive to 
think otherwise, arguing that "conclusions supported by common sense, 
practical observation, and abstract reasoning should not lightly be disre-
garded in the absence of convincing evidence that there is error. " 62 
This conclusion of anticompetitive effects is also supported by an 
analysis of the structural relationships produced by the extensive inter-
locks among leading American corporations. These deleterious effects 
can justifiably be presumed because they logically follow from the busi-
ness arrangements that those interlocks create. 63 A close look at the 
relationships established by unregulated interlocks illustrates their strong 
potential for producing anticompetitive consequences. 
Management Interlocks Between Directly Competing Corporations -
When officers of firm A sit on the board of a competing firm B, the two 
firms can be as closely linked as if the two shared common directors. The 
dangers inherent in this management interlock are the same as those 
found in direct interlocks between directly competing corporations. 64 
Both tend to unify the boards of competing firms, thus decreasing man-
agement independence, increasing the possibility of competitive informa-
tion being exchanged, and creating incentives for anticompetitive be-
havior. 
Indirect Interlocks Between Directly Competing Corporations - The 
potential anticompetitive effects here are similar to those inherent in 
direct and management interlocks. The competing corporations are still 
interlocked, albeit indirectly, and the dangers of the exchange of informa-
tion and anticompetitive conduct exist. 65 These dangers increase when 
58 In particular, the STAFF REPORT noted: 
[T]here is a dearth of objective, factual information on the social and economic 
effects, as embodied in actual business transactions, of decisions made by linked 
corporate managements. There is virtually no reliable current information available 
that will demonstrate either acceptable or undesirable effects that have resulted 
from the fact that common management personnel participated in, or influenced, 
particular business transactions. 
STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at 229. Nonetheless, such a study was deemed outside the 
scope of the report. "No attempt has been made to study the social or economic effects of 
these interlocks .... " Id. 
59 See notes 55-58 and accompanying text supra. 
60 FfC REPORT, supra note 20, at 36. 
61 STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at 230. 
62 Id. 
63 The Antitrust Subcommittee staff concluded that certain of these effects "would seem 
to be self-evident from an analysis of merely the structure of the organizations that have 
common management members .... " STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at 6. 
64 See note 21 and accompanying text supra. Indeed, the dangers of management inter-
locks may be greater since the interlocked officers are involved in the daily decisions of their 
corporation. See STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at 230. 
65 See Halverson, Interlocking Directorates-Present Antitrust Enforcement Interest 
Placed in Proper Analytical Perspective, 21 VILL. L. REV. 393, 402 (1976); Turner, supra 
note 40, at 337. · 
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competing firms A and B each have directors on the board of a major 
supplier or customer of their industry. Business discussed by this board is 
likely to be intimately related to the business· of A and B and such 
discussion between A and B's directors could produce effects similar to 
those of a direct interlock between the two. 66 In either case, competition 
is likely to be affected.67 
Direct Interlocks Between Indirectly Competing Corporations -
Whether firm D competes with a subsidiary of firm E or both D and E 
have subsidiaries that compete, the dangers arising from the interlock of 
D and E are proportional to the degree of control that the parents have 
over their subsidiaries. If the subsidiaries' major policies and operations 
are dictated by their parents, an interlock between the parents could serve 
to stifle competition just as if the parents competed directly. 68 With such 
close parental control, the potential anticompetitive effects of this inter-
lock are similar to those caused by direct interlocks between directly 
competing firms. 69 On the other hand, if the subsidiaries are autonomous 
or otherwise insulated from their parents' boards and formulate their own 
policies, then the severity of any anticompetitive effects of a parental 
interlock is lessened. 
Direct Interlocks Between Potential Competitors - Modem technol-
ogy permits flexibility in production in many industries, making it easier 
for a firm specializing in one area of production to switch to a parallel line 
of products. This relative ease in changing production lines makes poten-
tial competitors out of firms not currently making the same products. 70 
Interlocks between potential competitors may forestall such companies 
from invading one another's field, even though technological advances 
have increased the opportunities for doing so. 71 Specialization among 
manufacturing firms, accompanied by mutual forebearance that protects 
each from invasion of its market by others, limits the number of com-
petitors who produce a particular product. Such forebearance may be 
heightened by these interlocks. 72 
Vertical Interlocks - The interlocking of a supplier, firm I and a 
customer, firm J, is usually motivated by a desire to facilitate transactions 
between them. 73 The tendency of the interlocked firms to deal with each 
66 FTC REPORT, supra note 20, at 15. 
67 See Smith, Interlocking Directorates Among the "Fortune 500", 3 ANTITRUST L. & 
EcoN. REV. 47, 52 (Summer, 1970). The author concluded, "[l]n view of the recent findings 
of behavioral scientists in the area of 'interpersonal interaction,' it would be most extraordi-
nary if these lengthy and elaborate chains of indirect interlocks were not having an adverse 
effect on the vigor of competition among our larger corporate organizations." Id. 
68 See Kramer, supra note 32, at 1268 n.11. 
69 See note 21 and accompanying text supra. 
70 See text accompanying note 33 supra for an example of glass manufacturers specializ-
ing in different products but having the capability to produce each other's line. Similarly, 
textile machinery appears to possess a convertibility that would permit active competition 
between textile manufacturers not currently producing the same products. FTC REPORT, 
supra note 20, at 24. 
71 A pattern of direct and indirect interlocks, combined with the practice of buying and 
selling to one another, may contribute to the limiting of potential competition among 
chemical producers. FTC REPORT, supra note 20, at 24-25. 
72 Id. at 14, 24. 
73 Travers, supra note 21, at 851. 
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other creates the danger that the competitors of I and J will be foreclosed 
from dealing with the firm linked to their rival, thus reducing the competi-
tion between I and J and their respective competitors. 74 I and J might 
obtain an additional advantage over their competitors in that the interlock 
could give I preferential access to market outlets while J receives easier 
access to suppliers. 75 In other words, vertical interlocks are inconsistent 
with arm's-length dealings which prevent favoritism and assure access for 
other companies. 76 
Deputization Interlocks - Here, the directors of outside corporation X 
sit on the boards of competing firms L and M. These directors owe 
primary allegiance to X, and the danger is that X might use them to 
dampen competition between Land M. 77 For example, if firm X was a 
bank that had made substantial loans to L and M, it would be to X's 
advantage to try to restrict competition in an effort to benefit Land M. 78 
Similarly, if the bank, through its trust department, were a large stockhol- · 
der of Land M, it would be in the bank's interest to prevent vigorous 
competition between the two. 79 
Institutional Interlocks - Interlocks between major financial institu-
tions and the leading firms in a particular industry produce problems 
associated with both vertical and indirect horizontal interlocks. 80 But 
institutional interlocks also create additional problems of their own. 
These interlocks might foster the development of communities of interest 
strong enough that firms in the industry not so interlocked are handi-
capped in obtaining full financial services. 81 
The more capital intensive an industry is, the more severe such a 
handicap would be. The oil industry, for example, is very capital inten-
sive.82 A new firm wishing to enter the industry or even an existing one 
74 Halverson, supra note 65, at 401. 
75 Id. at 401. 
76 FTC REPORT, supra note 20, at 15. 
77 Travers, supra note 21, at 850. 
78 See Smith, supra note 67, at 52. 
79 See Dooley, The Interlocking Directorate, 59 AM. ECON. REV. 314, 318 (1%9). 
80 See note 37 supra. 
81 FTC REPORT, supra note 20, at 15; Halverson, supra note 65, at 402; Turner, supra note 
40, at 337. 
Institutional interlocks may have other anticompetitive effects. 
There is a concern that representation of competitors on the same bank boards, for 
example, may lead to exchanges of information between competitors, collusive 
activity, and possible communities of interest strong enough to provide a substan-
tial handicap to non-represented companies ... In addition it is not inconceivable 
that links between competing corporations created by the institutional interlock 
could provide a stimulus and a source of available capital for anticompetitive 
mergers, acquisitions, joint ventures and other transfers and combinations of 
corporate power. 
Hearings on Corporate Disclosure, supra note 42, at 901 (statement by Chairman Lewis A. 
Engman, FTC). 
82 See Moore, The Petroleum Industry, THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY 120-25 
(4th ed. W. Adams ed. 1971). 
Another example of a capital-intensive industry extensively interlocked with financial 
institutions is the machinery industry. Sources of finance capital have played significant 
roles in the operation and policy making in many of the largest machinery corporations. FTC 
REPORT, supra note 20, at 203. In fact, the institutional interlock is probably prevalent in all 
capital-intensive industries. Hearings on Corporate Disclosure, supra note 42, at 901. 
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wishing to expand requires enormous amounts of capital. The major 
commercial banks capable of funding such activity are already exten-
sively interlocked with the leading companies in the industry. 83 It may not 
be in the best interests of these banks to fund such activity due to the 
relations they have established with industry leaders through the inter-
locks. 84 Even if the banks were neutral with respect to such entry, the 
interlocked oil companies could establish preferential access to credit so 
that little credit would be left for their noninterlocked competitors.85 
The dangers of the seven kinds of unregulated interlocks do not end 
with each interlock's individual anticompetitive effects. Another con-
sequence of these interlocks is the resulting concentration of economic 
power in the board rooms of interlocked corporations. Preventing such a 
concentration is a goal not only of section 886 , but of all antitrust laws, 87 
for both economic and social reasons. With respect to economic con-
cerns, microeconomic theory shows what anticompetitive conduct can be 
expected from such a concentration and how the economic inefficiencies 
caused by the concentration can be remedied through competition. 88 
However, antitrust policy is more than just an "economic engineering 
project. " 89 It has long been recognized that a high degree of indepen-
dence in our economic system also serves social and political purposes.90 
Judge Hand, in the famous Alcoa decision,91 explained that there are 
more than just economic reasons for opposing concentrated economic 
power, and these are '' based upon the belief that great ind us trial consoli-
dations are inherently undesirable, regardless of their economic re-
sults. " 92 
The problems posed by the unregulated interlocks concern all our 
antitrust laws and not merely section 8. Their anticompetitive effects 
clearly are contrary to the congressional intent behind section 8 and 
conflict with the primary economic goal of increased competition. In 
addition, the extensive array of unregulated interlocks is inconsistent 
with social and political aims: in many instances the interlocks produce 
concentrations of economic power that offend fundamental social 
policies. 
83 See text accompanying note 42 supra. 
84 See 121 CONG. REc. E6146 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 1975) (remarks of Rep. Harrington). 
85 See Hearings on Corporate Disclosure, supra note 42, at 901. In 1974, the FfC 
authorized an investigation of whether the oil companies received preferential treatment 
from the banks they are interlocked with. The FTC also probed into whether these com-
panies influenced bank credit policies to encourage or inhibit various alternative energy 
sources. [1976] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. A-16. 
86 See note 24 and accompanying text supra. 
87 See United States v. Von's Grocery, 384 U.S. 270, 275 (1966); United States v. 
Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 
U.S. 294, 315 (1962). 
88 F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 8-19 
(1970); E. MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 445-47 (2d ed. 1975). 
89 A. NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE U.S.A. 429 (2d ed. 1971). 
90 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344(1962); United States v. Aluminum 
Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945). 
91 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
92 Id. at 428. A.O. Neale, a British observer of our antitrust laws, suggests that this 
opposition to concentrated economic power is in part due to "American distrust of all 
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Unregulated interlocks can be reached in three ways: through a broader 
reading of section 8, through the application of section 5 of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act, and through new legislation. 
A. Broader Reading of Section 8 
Section 8 has traditionally been employed against direct interlocks 
between directly competing corporations. Both the potential anticompeti-
tive effects of unregulated interlocks and the overall purpose of section 8 
support a broader application of the section to cover certain interlocks 
that previously have been thought to be outside its reach.93 A more 
expansive reading will have the most success with respect to deputization 
interlocks, through a broader reading of "director" to include both indi-
viduals and corporations, and direct interlocks between indirect com-
petitors, through a broader reading of "competitors" to include firms that 
compete with each other through their subsidiaries. It is less certain 
whether a more restrictive reading of the "other than" clause, which 
effectively exempts certain financial institutions, will be successful. 
l. Expansion of "Director": Applicability of Section 8 to Deputization 
Interlocks - A deputization interlock exists where an outside corpora-
tion, through its deputies, serves as the common director of two compet-
ing firms. 94 Under this approach, the outside corporation itself violates 
section S's prohibition against interlocking directorates. 
Such was the Govemments's allegation in United States v. Cleveland 
Trust Co. 95 In that case the defendant was the Cleveland Trust Company, 
the nation's sixteenth largest bank. Karch, chairman of Cleveland's 
board, sat on the board of Warner and Swasey Company, (W&S). Shaw, 
defendant's executive vice president, sat on the boards of Pneumo-
Dynamics Corporation, (Pneumo) and White Consolidated Industries, 
Inc., (White).96 All three companies competed in the manufacturing of 
complex machine tools.97 While the three firms had no common indi-
vidual director, the Government argued that the bank was a common cor-
porate director through representation by its "deputies" Karch and 
Shaw. 
The court recognized that this was an innovative application of section 
8 and that such an application raised the question whether a corporation 
sources of unchecked power. ... " He notes that "(t]his distrust may be seen in many 
spheres of American life .... It is expressed in theories of checks and balances and of 
separation of power." A. NEALE, supra note 89, at 430. 
93Cf. SCM Corp. v. FTC, 568 F.2d 807, 811 (2d Cir. 1977) (policy supports broad reading 
of section 8 with respect to corporate liability). 
94 See text accompanying notes 36, 77-79 supra. 
95 394 F. Supp. 699 (N .0. Ohio 1974), affd mem., 513 F.2d 633 (6th Cir. 1975). 
96 Id. at 705-06. 
97 Id. at 702-03. 
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may be deemed a director within the meaning of the section.98 The court, 
noting that this issue had never been judicially decided, left the question 
unanswered in denying the Government's motion for summary judg-
ment.99 
Section 8 provides that "no person at the same time shall be a director" 
of two or more competing frrms. 100 A corporation may be a "person" 
for the purposes of section 8.101 Furthermore, a corporation, as well as an 
individual director, is subject to section 8 prohibitions. 102 It follows that a 
corporation could indeed be considered a director within the meaning of 
section 8. 103 Consequently, the inquiry focuses on whether the shared 
directors of such a corporation are ''deputies.'' The mere showing that an 
outside corporation has its officers or directors on the boards of compet-
ing firms would be insufficient to justify application of the deputization 
theory. There must be something to indicate that a "deputy" or "agent" 
relationship exists between the outside corporation and its interlocked 
personnel, because the theory of deputization rests on the premise that 
the outside firm is acting through these individuals. 
The Government's notion of deputization in Cleveland Trust was 
largely predicated on Karch's and Shaw's being important officers of the 
bank and subject to its direction. 104 The court recognized the importance 
of such an association and pointed out that the question whether there ac-
tually was a "deputy" relationship required a full trial for determina-
tion.105 Analogous cases dealing with the theory of deputization have held 
that the issue "is a question of fact to be settled case by case. " 106 
In applying section 8 to deputization interlocks, the critical test is 
whether there is a deputy relationship between the outside corporation 
and the interlocked personnel. If one is found to exist, then the corpora-
tion should be considered a director and subjected to section S's prohibi-
98 Id. at 71 l. 
99 Id. The case was settled by a consent decree which seems to endorse the Government's 
theory. The decree prohibits Cleveland Trust from hiring any individual who is a director of 
a manufacturer of certain machine tools, if at the same time an officer of the defendant is a 
director in any of the other competing tool manufacturers. [1975-2] ThADE CASES (CCH) ,i 
60,6ll, at 67,684. 
JOO 15 u .s.c. § 19 (1970). 
101 15 U.S.C. § 12 (l970)(Section I of the Clayton Act). 
102 SCM Corp. v. FTC, 568 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1977). Defendant argued that only individu-
als violated section 8 and a corporation was not prohibited from having a director who also 
sat on the board of a competitor. The court rejected the argument and stated such an in-
terpretation would undermine section 8. Id. at 810-12. 
103 The idea of one corporation sitting on the board of another through a "deputy" has 
already been upheld with respect to 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970) (Section l6(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934). Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260, 262-65 (2d Cir. 1969), 
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1036 (1970); Marquette Cement Mfr. Co. v. Andreas, 239 F. Supp. 
962, 967 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). See also Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403, 409 (1962). 
10
• 392 F. Supp. 699, 710 (N.D. Ohio 1974). 
'°" Id. at 712. 
10
• Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260, 263 (2d Cir. l%9)(deputization theory 
with respect to 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970)), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1036 (1970); Marquette Ce-
ment Mfr. Co. v. Andreas, 239 F. Supp. 962, 967 (S.D.N. Y. 1965) (deputization theory with 
respect to 15 U.S.C. § 78p(l970)). 
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tion against interlocks. 
2. Restriction of the' 'Other Than" Clause: Applicability of Section 8 to 
Bank-Competing Nonbank Interlocks - The industrial corporations' 
provision of section 8 applies only to interlocks between two or more 
corporations "other than banks, banking associations, trust companies, 
and common carriers." 101 Traditionally, this has been interpreted to 
mean that section 8 applies only if neither corporation falls within the 
classification. 108 Recently, the Government has challenged this notion. In 
United States v. Crocker National Corp., 109 the Govement alleged that 
interlocks between commercial banks and insurance companies violated 
section 8. 110 It was stipulated that the interlocked companies competed in 
certain mortgage and real estate loans. 111 Essentially, the Government 
argued that the "other than" clause requires that only one interlocked 
corporation be an industrial one; only if both corporations are banks 
would the interlock be exempt from the industrial corporations' provi-
sion. Noting that banks were specifically dealt with in the first three 
paragraphs of section 8, the Government contended that the "other than" 
clause was intended to render the fourth paragraph of section 8 inapplica-
ble only where both corporations are banks. Any other interpretation 
would leave a "gaping loophole" that would allow interlocks between 
banks and competing nonbanks, because the first three paragraphs of 
section 8 deal with interlocks between banks and the fourth would then be 
restricted to interlocks between nonbanks. 112 
The court did not accept the Government's argument and held that a 
normal reading of the "other than" clause "compels the conclusion that 
the statute applies only to two corporations, neither of which is a 
bank. " 113 In addition to its "plain reading" of the section, the court 
further buttressed its position by referring to past administrative interpre-
tations114 and the legislative history of section 8. 115 
The court's decision effectively creates a loophole for interlocks be-
tween banks and competing nonbanks and its logic is far from compelling. 
107 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1970). The fourth paragraph of section 8 is known as the industrial 
corporations provision. See note 14 and accompanying text supra. 
!OB FTC REPORT, supra note 20, at 10; STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at 25. 
10
• 422 F. Supp. 686 (N.D. Cal. 1976), appeal and cross appeal docketed, Nos. 76-3614 
and 76-3615 (9th Cir. Oct. 20, 1976). 
110 Id. at 689. Specifically, two bank-insurance company interlocks were challenged. The 
first was between the Crocker National Bank (fourteenth largest bank) and the Metropolitan 
Life Insurance Co. (second largest insurance company), the Equitable Life Assurance 
Society of the United States (third largest), and the Mutual Life Insurance Co. of N.Y. 
(eleventh largest). The second was between the Bank of America (largest bank) and the 
Prudential Insurance Co. of America (largest insurance company). Id. at 687. 
111 Id. at 688. 
112 Id. at 689. 
"" Id. 
'" Id. at 690-92. 
115 Id. at 694-702. 
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Interlocks between banks and nonbanks clearly violate the policy of 
section 8. 116 In addition, there is no legislative history indicating that 
Congress intended to immunize these interlocks, especially when such 
immunity runs counter to the general prohibitions against interlocks 
among competitors. 117 
3. Expansion of "Competitor": Applicability of Section 8 to Direct 
Interlocks Between Indirectly Competing Firms - Interlocks between 
indirect competitors have gone unregulated because section 8 tradition-
ally has been limited to prohibiting interlocks between firms that compete 
directly rather than through their subsidiaries. However, an interlock 
between parent corporations that maintain control over their subsidiaries 
can stifle competition as if the parents themselves competed directly .118 
Use of section 8 to challenge these interlocks fits within the purpose of the 
section because, given sufficient parental control, the interlocked firms 
are effectively in direct competition. 
The Government has relied upon such a theory in two recent cases. In 
Cleveland Trust, 119 the Justice Department charged Cleveland Trust with 
sitting, through its deputies, on the boards of three competing tool manu-
facturers, Pneumo, White, and W & S. 120 It did not allege that the three 
directly competed with each other. 121 Rather, both Pneumo and W & S 
competed indirectly with White via its subsidiaries. 122 The Government 
argued that section 8 applied to interlocking directorates when one of the 
interlocked parents competes with a wholly owned subsidiary of the 
other, either directly or through its own subsidiary .123 The court did not 
decide the issue but implied that the applicability of section 8 depends on 
the degree of control that the parents exercise over their subsidiaries. 124 
In United States v. Crocker National Corp., 125 the Government cha!-
116 See ln re Perpetual Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 3 ThADE REG. REP. (CCH) ,r 21,371, at 
21,289-90 (1977). 
117 ld. at 21,290. Clearly, bank-insurance company interlocks give rise to concern. A 
competitive overlap between banks and insurance companies clearly exists in the area of 
real estate financing; an interlock between the two is a direct interlock between direct 
competitors. See 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ,r 50, I 19 (Testimony of Richard McClaren, 
Asst. Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, on H.R. 5700 before the House 
Comm. on Banking and Currency); Note, Interlocking Directorates Under the Clayton Act: 
A Realistic Look at the Nature of Banking and Insurance Today, 3 WEST. ST. U.L. REV. 
284, 291-92 (1976). The court in Crocker recognized this concern, 422 F. Supp. 686, 702 
(N .D. Cal. 1976), and deliberately left open the possibility that these interlocks could be 
attacked under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, Id. at 703 n.23. It now seems 
clear that they can be reached by section 5. See notes 173-74 and accompanying text infra. 
118 See text accompanying notes 68-69 supra. 
11
• 392 F. Supp. 699,712 (N.D. Ohio 1974). 
120 See notes 96-97 and accompanying text supra. 
121 392 F.Supp. 699, 712 (N.D. Ohio 1974). 
122 Specifically, Pneumo competed directly with W & Sand indirectly with White through 
White's subsidiary, the Bullard Co. W & S competed with Bullard both directly and indi-
rectly through its own subsidiary, G.A. Gray Co. ld. at 702-03. 
123 Id. at 712. 
12• Id. 
125 422 F.Supp. 686 (N.D. Cal. 1976) .. 
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lenged interlocks involving banks that were wholly owned subsidiaries. 
The Government not only attacked bank-insurance company inter-
locks, 126 but also challenged interlocks between the banks' parent com-
panies, otherwise known as bank holding companies, and insurance co-
panies.127 The Government argued that the bank holding companies com-
peted, through their subsidiary banks, with the insurance companies; 
therefore, the interlocks between them violated section 8. 128 The court 
held that such interlocks are not prohibited because the exemption of the 
subsidiary banks from the industrial corporations' provision of section 8 
should extend to their parents .129 The court deliberately did not decide 
the broader question of section S's applicability to direct interlocks be-
tween indirect competitors but implied that it supported such applicabil-
ity .130 
The most limited purpose that can be attributed to section 8 is preven-
tion of the anticompetitive effects caused by interlocks among com-
petitors. If a parent exercises sufficient control over its subsidiary's 
policies and operations, then an interlock between the parent and the 
subsidiary's competitor presents the same problems as if the parent itself 
directly competed with its interlocked partner. Use of section 8 against 
such interlocks merely fulfills that section's purpose. 
The key issue in applying section 8 is the degree of control that the 
parent has over its subsidiary .131 Due to the complexity of ascertaining 
the degree of control which exists, such a determination must be made on 
a case by case basis. A high degree of control warrants the application of 
the section, whereas if the subsidiary is autonomous, an interlock be-
tween one of its competitors and its parent is less likely to produce any 
anticompetitive effects. 
B. Section 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act (FTCA) 
Section 5 prohibits "unfair methods of competition" and "unfair or 
126 Id. at 689. 
127 Id. at 687. The interlocks challenged were between the parent corporations and the 
insurance companies interlocked with the parents' respective subsidiary banks. Id. 
128 Id. at 703-04. 
12
• Id. at 704-05. 
130 Id. at 705 n.25. Concerning the interlocks between the bank subsidiaries and the 
insurance companies, the court noted that, "were this court of the opinion that the underly-
ing bank interlocks [bank-insurance co.] challenged here were illegal, it would seem that a 
strong case could be built for holding that section 8 reached this particular type of ind_irect 
interlock [bank holding co.-insurance co.] as well." Id. 
131 Both courts and parties recognize this. In Cleveland Trust, the Government submitted 
evidence that the subsidiaries of White and W & S were both wholly owned and strongly tied 
to their parents; the defendants attempted to rebut that evidence. The court stated that the 
determination of the degree of parental control must await trial and full record. 392 F. Supp. 
699, 712 (N.D. Ohio 1974). In Crocker, the Government argued that registration of the 
parent companies as bank holding companies under the Bank Holding Company Act, 12 
U.S.C. §§ 1841-44 (1970), established the fact that.they control their subsidiary banks. The 
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deceptive acts or practices" in or affecting commerce. 132 The FTC is 
authorized to use section 5 to prohibit practices contrary to the spirit of 
the antitrust laws, even if they do not actually violate the letter of the 
law. 133 The unregulated interlocks can be presumed to have the anticom-
petitive consequences with which Congress was concerned in passing 
section 8, 134 yet traditionally they have been treated as outside the reach 
of the section. 135 The FTC has used section 5 to effectuate the purpose of 
other provisions of the Clayton Act in instances where the spirit, if not the 
letter, of those provisions was violated. 136 Similar use of the section in 
regard to section 8, then, should be viewed neither as a radical use of 
section 5 nor as an unwarranted expansion of section 8. 
The use of section 5 in challenging interlocks requires that the inter-
locks be treated as unfair methods of competition. This raises two issues: 
first, defining unfair methods of competition, and second, determining 
whether unregulated interlocks come within that definition. 
In enacting section 5, Congress deliberately did not define unfair 
methods of competition. 137 Initially, the Supreme Court held that the 
courts, not the FTC, would determine which actions were unfair methods 
of competition. 138 The Court later retreated from this position by defer-
ring to the FTC's determination of which practices were covered, holding 
that Congress did not intend to confine "unfair competition" to fixed 
categories. 139 It is now recognized that the FTC has broad powers to 
declare trade practices unfair. The FTC is authorized to use section 5 to 
stop acts in their incipiency which, if allowed to reach fruition, would 
violate the antitrust laws. 140 It can also prohibit acts that conflict with the 
general spirit and policy of the antitrust laws, even though these practices 
might not violate the actual letter of the law. 141 
Recently, the Court in FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co. 142 held that the 
parent companies contended they did not have enough control to attribute the banks' 
policies to them. 422 F. Supp. 686, 704 (N.D. Cal. 1976). 
132 15 U .S.C. § 45(a)(I) (Supp. V. 1975). When the FTC believes a person is engaging in an 
unfair method of competition, it issues a complaint and initiates its own administrative 
proceedings. Should the conduct be judged unlawful, the Commission is authorized to issue 
an order requiring the discontinuance of the practice. Violation of the final cease and desist 
order results in penalties of up to $10,000 for each day of the violation. 
Only the FTC is empowered to enforce section 5; there can be no enforcement by private 
litigants. In challenging interlocks with section 8 rather than with section 5, the Justice 
Department and private parties, as well as the FTC, can contest the interlocks. See note 4 
supra. 
133 See notes 140-45 and accompanying text infra. 
134 See text accompanying notes 7-10, 23-27, and 64-85 supra. 
135 See text accompanying notes 16-20 supra. 
136 See notes 149-57 and accompanying text infra. 
137 S. REP. No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1914). See notes 146-47 and accompanying 
text infra. 
138 FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 427 (1920). 
139 FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bros., 291 U.S. 304, 314 (1934). 
140 FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394-95 (1953). 
141 FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 321 (1966). See also Fashion Originator's Guild 
of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 463 (1941) (if activity runs counter to public policy 
declared in the Sherman and Clayton Acts it is an unfair method of competition and the FTC 
can suppress it under section 5). 
142 405 U.S. 233 (1972). 
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FTC has the power in determining whether a practice is unfair, to con-
sider public values beyond those encompassed in either the letter or the 
spirit of the antitrust laws. 143 Although the Court did not specify the 
values that the FTC should consider, it did note certain criteria that the 
FTC has looked to in the past in deciding whether a practice should be 
prohibited as unfair. 144 These standards include whether the conduct 
offends public policy, whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or 
unscrupulous, and whether it causes substantial injury to consumers, 
competitors, or other businessmen. 145 
Given the FTC's broad powers and standards, the unregulated inter-
locks clearly fall within the spectrum of activities that can be considered 
unfair methods of competition. In addition, treatment of these interlocks 
in this manner is supported both by congressional intent in enacting 
section 5 and by the relation of the section to other provisions of the 
Clayton Act. 
The drafters of section 5 considered incorporating specific language 
concerning interlocking directorates into the section. 146 Although Con-
gress later decided not to define explicitly which practices were unfair 
methods of competition, it clearly intended that section 5 reach inter-
locks.147 Indeed, it has been suggested that section 8 was not written 
more broadly because of the belief that the other interlocks would be 
covered under section 5.148 
143 Id. at 244. The Commission determined that Sperry & Hutchinson's activities prevent-
ing independent promoters from dealing in its stamps violated section 5, but the Fifth Circuit 
reversed on the grounds that the Commission failed to show that the defendant's conduct 
violated either the letter or spirit of the antitrust laws. Id. at 234-35. The Court held that 
unfair methods of competition are not limited to such activities. Id. at 243-44. However, 
because the Commission did not consider these independent public values, the Court 
remanded the case to the Fifth Circuit with instructions that it be remanded to the FTC for 
further proceedings. Id. at 247-50. Concerning the public values beyond those encompassed 
in the antitrust laws, see Speigal, Inc. v. FTC, 540 F.2d 287, 293 (7th Cir. 1976) (practice is 
unfair when it offends established policy and when the practice is immoral, unethical, 
oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers). See also National 
Candy Co. v. FTC, 104 F.2d 999, 1006 (7th Cir. 1939) (a violation of public policy is an injury 
to the public, and it is in the public interest to prevent the use of a method of competition 
that is contrary to an established public policy even if injury to competitiors is not alleged or_ 
proved). 
144 405 U.S. 233, 244 n.5. (1972). See FTC Statement of Basis and Purpose of Trade Regu-
lation Rule 408, Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes in Relation to 
the Health Hazards of Smoking, 29 Fed. Reg. 8,355 (1964). 
145 405 U.S. 233, 244 n.5 (1972). 
146 51 CONG. REc. 11106 (1914) (remarks of Sen. Newlands, chairman of the Senate 
Committee on Interstate Commerce that inserted the essential language of section 5). 
147 The Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce stated: 
The Committee gave careful consideration to the question as to whether it would 
attempt to define the many and variable unfair practices which prevail in commerce 
and to forbid their continuance or whether it would, by a general declaration 
condemning unfair practices, leave it to the commission to determine what prac-
tices were unfair. It concluded that the latter course would be the better .... The 
Committee was of the opinion that it would be better to put in a general provision 
condemning unfair competition than to attempt to define the numerous unfair prac-
tices, such as local price cutting, interlocking directorates . ... 
S. REP. No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1914) (emphasis added). 
148 Travers, supra note 21, at 831-32. 
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Use of section 5 to deal with interlocks outside the literal language of 
section 8 would be consistent with the way section 5 has been used to 
effectuate the policies of other provisions of the antitrust laws. Section 
2(d) of the Clayton Act149 forbids a seller from making an allowance for 
services rendered him by a buyer unless it is made available to the latter's 
competitors on proportionately equal terms; the section does not mention 
the buyers' liability. In Grand Union v. FJ'C, 150 Grand Union was 
charged with knowingly inducing and receiving from sellers special ben-
efits that were not proportionately made available to its competitors. The 
court upheld the Commission's decision that Grand Union's conduct as a 
buyer violated section 5, notwithstanding the silence of section 2(d) on 
this issue. The court found the basic policy behind section 2(d) to be the 
prevention of abuses of buying power. Even though Grand Union did not 
violate the literal language of section 2(d), the court held that its conduct 
was inconsistent with that section's purpose. 151 The court stated that 
activities running counter to the public policies declared in the Sherman 
and Clayton Acts are unfair methods of competition. 152 Thus, it was 
proper to treat Grand Union's conduct as an unfair method of competi-
tion.-
Similarly, section 5 has been used to prohibit practices that, while not 
actually in violation of section 3 of the Clayton Act, 153 are clearly con-
trary to the spirit of the section. Section 3 deals with, inter alia, exclusive 
dealing contracts. In FJ'C v. Brown Shoe Co., Inc., 154 the court upheld 
the Commission's finding that the contracts of Brown Shoe, a shoe 
manufacturer, with independent shoe retailers constituted unfair methods 
of competition. The FTC had charged that these contracts served to 
foreclose Brown Shoe's competitors from access to these retailers. 155 
Although a section 3 violation requires proof that the contracts' effect 
may be to substantially lessen competition, the Court declared that no 
such proof was necessary to establish a section 5 violation. 156 The Court 
held that when a practice is contrary to the spirit of the law, the FTC has 
the authority to declare it an unfair method of competition even though it 
does not actually violate the literal language of the statute. 157 
The FTC, however, has only recently begun to utilize section 5 in 
149 15 u.s.c. § 13(d) (1970). 
150 300 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1962). 
151 Id. at 99. 
152 Id. at 98. 
15 3 15 u.s.c. § 14 (1970). 
154 384 U.S. 316 (1966). 
155 These contracts provided that if the shoe retailers restricted their purchases of shoes to 
buying from Brown Shoe, then Brown Shoe would give them special treatment and benefits 
that it did not give to other shoe retailers. Id. at 317. 
156 Id. at 322. 
157 Id. at 321. The Court found the policy behind section 3 to be the prohibition of 
contracts that restricted the freedom of purchasers to buy in an open market. See L. G. 
Balfour Co. v. FfC, 442 F.2d I, 8, 20 (7th Cir. 1971), where the FfC charged that 
<iefendant' s exclusive dealing contracts were unfair methods of competition. For these to be 
illegal under section 3, a likelihood of market foreclosure must be shown. The court held that 
no such evidence is necessary under section 5 and that the FfC is empowered to use the 
section to prohibit practices which run counter to the basic policies of the antitrust laws. See 
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challenging interlocks. In its initial complaints, the FTC used the section 
in conjunction with section 8. Most of these complaints ended in consent 
orders, 158 and the issue of whether the interlocks violated section 5 did 
not reach the Commission until the Kraftco case. 159 The FTC's complaint 
in Kraftco charged that the interlock between Kraftco Corp. and SCM 
Corp., competitors in the sale of margarine, edible oils and barbecue 
sauce, violated sections 5 and 8. Shortly after the complaint was issued, 
Bond, the common director, and Kraftco agreed to consent orders. 160 
SCM answered the complaint and argued, inter alia, that section 8 pro-
hibits only individuals from being joint directors in competing corpora-
tions and does not forbid the corporations themselves from having com-
mon directors. 161 The Commission rejected SCM's argument and ruled 
that corporations, as well as individuals, are liable for section 8 viola-
tions. 162 The Commission further found that even if section 8 is not 
applicable to corporations, section 5 nonetheless applies and in this case 
prohibits SCM's practice of sharing a common director. 163 It stated that 
section 5 extends to practices that offend the spirit as well as the letter of 
the antitrust laws and that use of the section in the present case merely 
implements the purpose of section 8. 164 The Commission also noted that 
section 5 had already been used to effectuate the purposes of other 
provisions of the Clayton Act, 165 and stated that the legislative history of 
section 5 indicates Congress fully contemplated the application of the 
section to interlocks. 166 
also Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (defendant's 
combination held to be prohibited by section 5 because it violates the policies of both the 
Sherman and Clayton Acts). 
158 The following consent orders ended FTC action against interlocks in which all of the 
complaints alleged both section 5 and section 8 violations: 82 F.T.C. 1814 (1973) (interlocks 
between metal companies prohibited); 83 F.T.C. 1204 (1974) (interlock between Chrysler 
and General Electric prohibited; the two competed in the air conditioning market); 84 F .T.C. 
429 (1974) (interlock between safety helmet manufacturers prohibited); 86 F.T.C. 196 (1975) 
(interlocks among energy competitors prohibited); 89 F.T.C. 91 (1977) (interlocks between 
data communications terminal manufacturers prohibited). 
159 In re Kraftco Corp., 89 F.T.C. 46, 60 (1977), a.ff'd, SCM Corp. v. FTC, 568 F.2d 807 
(2d Cir. 1977). 
160 See 87 F.T.C. 809, 811 (1976) (Bond's consent order); 88 F.T.C. 362, 364 (1976) 
(Kraftco's consent order). 
161 89 F.T.C. 46, 61 (1977). 
162 Id. at 62-63. The Commission based its decision both on policy reasons underlying the 
prohibitions of section 8 and on section 11 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 21 (1970)) which 
provides for the enforcement of section 8 and leaves no doubt that the FTC has the power 
"to remedy a violation of section 8 by entering an order to cease and desist against 
corporations." Id. SCM appealed the decision and the Second Circuit upheld the Commis-
sion's ruling. SCM Corp. v. FTC, 568 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1977). See note 102 supra. 
i6a 89 F.T.C. 46, 63 (1977). 
164 The Commission declared: 
Assuming arguendo that illegally interlocked corporations must be allowed to 
escape liability through the allegedly porous wording of section 8, no better illustra-
tion of a practice offensive to the spirit and policy of the antitrust laws if not their 
letter can be imagined than the employment and retention by a corporation of a 
director whose presence on the board itself violates the law. Application of the 
section in such a case does no more than effectuate the clear purpose of the 
Clayton Act. Id. at 63-64. (Emphasis added). 
165 Id. See text accompanying notes 149-57 supra. 
166 Id. See text accompanying notes 146-48 supra. 
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In Kraftco, the challenged interlock violated both section 8 and section 
5. Although the finding of illegality under section 5 was not essential to 
the Commission's holding, Kraftco is important because it recognizes that 
section 5 applies to interlock~. Thus, Kraftco lays the foundation for the 
section's use in challenging interlocks in the absence of a concurrent 
violation of section 8. 
In re Perpetual Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n 167 was the first case in 
which the FfC raised a section 5 attack against an interlock falling outside 
the literal language of section 8. The defendant savings and loan associa-
tion competed with its interlocked commercial banks in the solicitation 
and maintenance of savings accounts and in the financing of real estate 
loans.168 Finding that the interlocks violate section 5,169 the Commission 
observed that the acts clearly violate the policy of section 8, 170 even 
though such activity may be outside the literal prohibition of that sec-
tion.171 Furthermore, the Commission noted the absence of evidence in-
dicating that Congress intended to immunize such interlocks. 172 
The Perpetual case173 authorizes the use of section 5 against horizontal 
interlocks between competitors that are not covered by section 8. Under 
the Perpetual reasoning, bank-insurance company interlocks like those in 
Crocker 174 can be challenged under section 5 regardless of whether they 
are prohibited by the literal language of section 8: both Perpetual and 
Crocker involved interlocks between banks and competing nonbanks. 
Furthermore, Perpetual appears to put management interlocks between 
directly competing corporations175 within the reach of section 5. The 
Commission in Perpetual stressed the "unmistakable" congressional in-
tent to outlaw interlocks between competitors .176 A management inter-
lock brings together two competitors just as effectively as an interlock 
between a bank and a competing nonbank. Both are outside the literal 
language of section 8, but both clearly violate the section's policy. 
It is not clear how far the Perpetual rationale can be extended with 
167 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ,i 21,371 (1977). 
168 Id. at 21,287. See also Comment, Interlocks in Management Between Savings and 
Loan Associatons and Commercial Banks Under the Antitrust Laws and the Federal Trade 
Commission Act, 65 Goo. L.J. 1263, 1267-68 (1977); 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ,I 50, 119; supra 
note 123. 
169 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ,i 21,371, at 21,285. The final cease and desist order applied 
only to Perpetual because the banks are outside FTC jursidiction. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) 
(Supp. V 1975). However, the Commission found that this "fact does not affect the 
Commission's ability to adjudicate the legality of Perpetual' s interlocks and to issue an order 
against Perpetual. It is not necessary to join in the suit all parties to an illegal arrangement," 
Id. at 21,286, n.7. 
110 Id. at 21,288. The Commission noted that Congress, at a minimum, unmistakably 
intended to outlaw interlocks between substantial competitiors. Id. 
171 Id. at 21,290. The Commission referred to the Crocker decision in which the district 
court held that section 8 did not reach bank-competing nonbank interlocks. The court 
deliberately withheld opinion as to the legality of such interlocks under section 5. See text 
accompanying note 113 supra. 
172 Id. at 21,290. 
173 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ,i 21,371 (1977). 
174 422 F. Supp. 686 (N.D. Cal. 1976). See text accompanying notes 110-17 supra. 
175 See text accompanying note 64 supra. 
176 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ,i 21,371, at 21,288 (1977). 
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regard to other interlocks not prohibited by the letter of section 8. 177 Of 
the remaining unregulated interlocks, the indirect interlock between di-
rectly competing corporations 178 involves anticompetitive effects similar 
to those which provoked the congressional concern noted in Perpetual .179 
The indirect interlock brings competitors together, albeit indirectly, as 
does the direct interlock which was the focus of congressional activity. 
Consequently, the Perpetual rationale supports the application of section 
5 to indirect interlocks between direct competitors. At the same time, this 
application of section 5 would also serve as a means for indirectly attack-
ing institutional interlocks180 because these interlocks are analytically a 
combination of vertical and indirect interlocks. 181 Applicability of the 
section to the other unregulated interlocks is less certain, although the 
Perpetual rationale appears to support a broad utilization of section 5. 
Another important question is whether the FTC should treat all cur-
rently unregulated interlocks as per se illegal under section 5, as it treated 
interlocks between banks and competing nonbanks in Perpetual. 182 In 
adopting a per se rule, thus eliminating the need to examine anticompeti-
tive effects in individual cases, the probability and severity of anticom-
petitive consequences likely to be caused by a particular class of inter-
locks must be balanced against their beneficial effects, if any .183 Aper se 
approach is justified only when the former clearly outweighs the latter. 
Management interlocks between directly competing corporations 
should be treated as per se violations, because, except for the formal titles 
of the person serving as director, they are indistinguishable from the in-
terlocks presently prohibited by section 8.184 All the anticompetitive ef-
fects produced by direct interlocks between directly competing corpora-
tions185 can be caused as easily by management interlocks. 186 Since the 
established per se approach to direct interlocks is warranted, the treat-
ment of management interlocks in the same manner is justified. 
The indirect interlock between directly competing corporations, how-
ever, should not be subject to aper se rule under section 5. Even though 
logic and common sense support the conclusion that such interlocks have 
anticompetitive effects, 187 there is a lack of empirical evidence on this 
177 Owen M. Johnson, Director of the Bureau of Competition at the FfC, expressed 
interest in using the section in this manner. He said the FfC was pressing the Perpetual case 
to see if section 5 could be applied to interlocks other than direct interlocks between direct 
competitors. [1976] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. A-13. 
178 See text accompanying notes 65-67 supra. 
179 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ,i 21,371, at 21,299 (1977). 
180 See text accompanying notes 80-85 supra. 
181 See note 37 supra. Such an approach would reduce these interlocks to a series of 
vertical ones. 
182 3 TlwJE REG. REP. (CCH) ,i 21,371, at 21,290 (1977). The Commission stated that in the 
instant case (interlock between competitors) no showing of any adverse effect on competition 
was necessary in finding a section 5 violation. Id. at 21,291. 
183 For a discussion of the appropriateness of per se rules, see Continental T. V., Inc. v. 
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49-50 (1977). 
184 See text accompanying note 29 supra. 
185 For these anticompetitive effects see text accompanying note 21 supra. 
186 For these anticompetitive effects see text accompanying note 64 supra. 
187 See text accompanying notes 60-62 supra. 
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question. 188 The absence of such evidence indicates that a strict per se 
approach to indirect interlocks may be too harsh. Because the indirect 
interlock lacks the structural similarity to direct interlocks that manage-
ment interlocks have, a per se rule is not justified. Therefore, a notion of 
presumptive illegality should be employed .189 In responding to a section 5 
complaint, the interlocked firms would have the opportunity to rebut this 
presumption by establishing that the interlock is not anticompetitive. 
C. New Legislation 
The third way to reach the unregulated interlocks is through new 
legislation. The most extreme plan is to extend section S's per se prohibi-
tion of direct interlocks between direct competitors to include all of the 
unregulated interlocks. Proposed legislation 190 of this kind is currently 
before Congress. H.R. 7337 prohibits interlocks, including management 
interlocks, where two companies are actual or potential competitors, 
where one of the companies is an ~ctual or potential customer, supplier, 
or source of credit or capital, and where one of the companies is a holding 
company. The bill also prohibits deputization interlocks. 191 
Such a broad per se approach is not justified at this time. Legislated per 
se rules condemn certain conduct without examining the effects in an 
individual case. Even though the presumption that these interlocks pro-
duce anticompetitive effects is sound, it alone, in the absence of empirical 
evidence, may not warrant such a sweeping per se rule. In support of this 
view, the staff of the House Antitrust Subcommittee proposed a "model" 
bill which takes a broad per se approach toward interlocks, but they did 
not recommend passage of the bill until more specific information on the 
188 See text accompanying notes 55-58 supra. 
189 One commentator has suggested that a rule of presumptive illegality be applied to 
vertically imposed exclusive territory arrangements. Baker, Vertical Restraints In Times of 
Change: From White to Schwinn To Where?, 44 ANTITRUST L.J. 537 (1975). 
190 H.R. 7337, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (introduced May 23, 1977). The bill has been referred 
to the House Judiciary Committee but there has been no report on its status. 
191 The pertinent section of H.R. 7337 states: 
SEC. 8. (a) It shall be unlawful, unless specific approval for such relationship has 
been granted by the Attorney General of the United States, upon due showing, in 
the form and manner prescribed by the Attorney General, that such relationship in 
consideration of all relevant factors accords to the maximum extent practicable 
with the objectives of the antitrust laws -
(I) for any natural person who is a director, officer, or employee with manage-
ment functions of any person engaged in commerce, at the same time to hold the 
position of director, officer, or employee with management functions, or to have a 
representative or nominee who represents such person as a director, officer, or 
employee with management functions, in any other person (a) who is an actual or 
potential competitor, or (b) who is an actual or potential customer, or supplier, or 
source of credit or capital, or (c) whose principal business in purpose or in fact is 
the holding of stock in, or control of, any other person in commerce; 
(2) for any person engaged in commerce knowingly to have a director, officer, or 
employee with management functions who, at the same time, holds the position of 
director, officer, or employee with management functions, or who has a represen-
tative or nominee who represents such person as a director, officer, or employee 
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economic consequences of interlocks has been gathered .192 
H.R. 7337 is the latest in a series of identical bills, all of which have 
taken a broad per se approach in dealing with interlocks.193 None of these 
bills has ever been reported out of committee, and such a bill has little 
chance of passage. Political reality, together with the absence of empirical 
evidence, dictate that the legislation be more limited in scope. 
A more moderate approach would be to regulate only interlocks be-
tween the largest corporations. Because the anticompetitive effects are 
most severe in interlocks among these corporations, some commentators 
have suggested that these interlocks should be the center of congressional 
activity. 194 Legislation that would prohibit interlocks among large cor-
porations195 would eliminate the interlocking relationships not presently 
reached by section 8 and would provide some of the benefits of a per se 
rule while avoiding the costs of a comprehensive ban. Interlocks among 
corporations not meeting the size requirements would still be subject to 
both Justice Department and FTC action. 
A less ambitious proposal would be to extend section 8'sper se prohibi-
tion only to include management interlocks between directly competing 
corporations.196 As previously noted,197 the tendency of management 
interlocks to have anticompetitive effects is equal to that of direct inter-
locks between direct competitors. Because the structure and effects of 
these interlocks are virtually identical, treatment of one on a per se basis 
warrants the same treatment for the other. Under this scheme, the other 
types of interlocks would be dealt with by section 8 of the Clayton Act 
and section 5 of the FTCA. If Congress takes any action at all concerning 
interlocks, it should at least extend section 8 in this manner. At this time, 
however, no legislation concerning interlocks is likely to be enacted. 
with management functions, in any other person (a) who is an actual or potential 
competitor, or (b) who is an actual or potential customer, or supplier, or source of 
credit or capital, or (c) whose principal business in purpose or in fact is the holding 
of stock in, or control of, any other person in commerce; 
(3) for any person to be a representative or nominee of any person who is a 
director, officer, or employee with management functions of any person engaged in 
commerce so that such director, officer, or employee with management functions 
may hold the position of director, officer, or employee with management functions, 
in any other person (a) who is an actual or potential competitor, or (b) who is an 
actual or potential customer, or supplier, or source of credit or capital, or (c) whose 
principal business in purpose or in fact is the holding of stock in, or control of, any 
other person in commerce. 
192 See STAFF REPORT, supra note 4, at 231-32. 
193 See H.R. 111 IO, 94th Cong., lst Sess. (1975); H.R. 4406, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975); 
H.R. 14997, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); H.R. 13581, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); H.R. 3245, 
92d Cong., lst Sess. (1971); H.R. 2346, 9Ist. Cong., Ist Sess. (1969); H.R. 2509, 90th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1967); H.R. 11572, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). 
194 See Kramer, supra note 32, at 1274; Turner, supra note 40, at 338-39. 
19
• For example, the ban could apply to those with sales or assets over 500 million dollars. 
This figure would bring the 372 largest industrial corporations, ranked by sales, under the 
statute's coverage. To cover the top 500 firms, the figure would have to be lowered to 300 
million dollars. FORTUNE, May 1977, at 364-89. The exact figure need not be 500 million; it 
can be any amount that would exclude all but the leading industrial corporations. 
196 See Travers, supra note 21, at 846-48. 
197 See text accompanying note 64 supra. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Section 8 of the Oayton Act was enacted in order to prevent the use of 
interlocking directorates to reduce competition. However, several kinds 
of interlocks traditionally not covered by section 8 have serious potential 
for anticompetitive abuse. While no empirical studies have been underta-
ken to analyze the economic consequences of these interlocks, logic and 
common sense lead to the presumption that they are anticompetitive. As 
conventionally applied, then, section 8 has failed to fulfill its purpose. 
Unregulated interlocks can be challenged in three ways. Moving away 
from the narrow interpretation traditionally given to section 8 has the 
greatest chance of success in dealing with deputization interlocks and 
direct interlocks between indirect competitors. A second approach is to 
use section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act to attack these 
interlocks. In Perpetual, the FTC was successful in its application of the 
section to interlocks that are between direct competitors and outside the 
scope of section 8. The effectiveness of this approach depends upon how 
far the Perpetual rationale is taken. At a minimum, the decision indicates 
that management interlocks and indirect interlocks between direct com-
petitors are within the section's scope. 
The third method is to enact new legislation concerning interlocks. In 
the absence of empirical evidence, the best proposal would create a 
limited per se ban on interlocks among corporations over a certain size. 
This would avoid the cost of a sweeping per se ban while taking into 
account that interlocks between corporate giants pose the greatest con-
cern. However, enactment in the near future of any legislation regulating 
interlocking directorates is not likely. The practical result is that any 
action taken against the unregulated interlocks will have to be through 
section 8 of the Clayton Act and section 5 of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act. 
-Richard P. Murphy 
